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The Defense Message System (DMS) is being implemented throughout the 
Department of Defense and will replace AUTODIN for individual and 
organizational messages by the year 2000. The Naval Security Group 
Detachment, Monterey and any other command that sends or receives 
organizational or individual messages must be ready to implement DMS on their 
Local Area Network. This thesis fully describes the Defense Messaging System 
standards and components and details what needs to be implemented in a Local 
Area Network in order to be prepared for the initial operating capability of the 
DMS, scheduled for July, 1996. 
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As the Department of Defense (DoD) migrates away from all defense legacy 
messaging systems (e.g., Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and proprietary e-mail 
systems) the Defense Message System (DMS) will be the single, seamless, end-to-end global 
electronic messaging service that meets the future DoD messaging requirements. The DMS 
supports new advances in technology that allow for the exchange of multimedia messages and 
attachments. The DMS provides a template for evolving with future technical advances. The 
full operational capability for DMS is targeted for the year 2000, when AUTODIN is phased 
out and all organizational and individual messaging in DoD is supported by DMS alone. The 
DMS is based on international standards consistent with Secretary ofDefense guidelines to 
avoid unique military specifications whenever possible. The DoD intention is that the DMS 
will be implemented in all environments (e.g., strategic, tactical, fixed, and mobile.) This 
messaging service is a critical component of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and 
supports command and control, administrative, and intelligence information exchange to 
enhance readiness and war fighting capabilities (Paige, 1995). Figure 1 summarizes the need 
for the DMS. Consider a U.S. Army infantryman in the field with a pair of binoculars waiting 
for the exact moment to contact the nearest U.S. or Allied aircraft carrier and have them 
launch their on deck alert strike package. As the DMS is implemented throughout the DoD 
on various computer networks, it is vital that the meaning of a secure local area network be 
understood. It is equally important to know what the DMS is and what it is not. This thesis 




• We must posture for the 21st century 
- Modern msg system is mandatory to provide: 
• Guaranteed timely delivery 
• Authentication of sender & receiver 
• End-to-end security 
• AUTODIN can't support today's warlighter needs 
- Antiquated 1960's technology 
- Falling behind the Ops Tempo of the 1990's and beyond 
• OMS promises interoperabilitv for Joint & Coalition warfare 
National Security Agency's (NSA) Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative (MIS SI) 
to provide secure communications over untrusted networks. 
B. WHAT IS A SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK 
"We are at risk." 
So begins a report of the National Research Council, a research arm of the National 
Academy of Sciences, on the subject of computer security chaired by Dr. David D. Clark of 
MIT (Malamud, 1992). According to the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) 
network security is defined as follows: 
Network security is the protection of networks and their services from 
unauthorized modification, destruction, or disclosure, and providing an 
assurance that the network performs its critical functions correctly with no 
harmful side-effects. It also includes providing for information accuracy 
(NCSC, 1987). 
A network needs a security infrastructure. Within the confines of work groups, the 
structure may be fairly loose, but will guard against unauthorized intrusions from other work 
groups. A work group is defined as a group of people brought together and assigned to 
perform a specific task on their own isolated network as a work group network. Even in the 
broad confines of the Internet, security is becoming increasingly important. Episodes like the 
Morris worm, a 1988 worm that was able to paralyze the Internet for several days, not only 
exhibit the vulnerability of networks, but draw the attention of policy makers to the limitations 
of networks (Malamud, 1992). The network security problem can be divided into two 
components. 
1. Data Security 
The requirements for data security are: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and 
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access control. Although encryption is an integral part of data security, it does not solve all 
the computer security problems by itself Some of the tools required to ensure data security 
are either the DMS or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)/Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extension(MJME)/Mime Object Security Service (MOSS) products. Confidentiality ensures 
that information is not made available to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. 
Authentication provides for the verified identity of a communications peer entity. Integrity 
protects against unauthorized modification, insertion, or deletion. Access control allows only 
authorized users to send or receive messages or data. 
2. Securing the Transmission Channels 
The requirements for securing the transmission channels are: denial of service, traffic 
analysis, and availability. The tools required to ensure transmission channel security are 
correctly implemented link end to end encryption, network management, and traffic flow 
confidentiality. 
C. CONCERNS FOR ALLOWING TOP SECRET (TS) AND SENSITIVE BUT 
UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) INFORMATION ON THE SAME NETWORK 
In a multilevel security network, two or more people with different levels of security 
clearance wish to have access to the network. This imposes a hierarchy of security levels on 
the network. A multilevel secure network must preserve the Bell~LaPadula properties of 
access to data (Pfleeger, 1989): 
1. The simple security property states that no user may read data at a higher level 
than that for which a person is authorized. 
2. The star property states that no person may write data to a level lower than that 
person has accessed. 
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We can see that meeting these two properties is a very difficult task, especially for 
personnel with higher security levels, because once they have accessed data at a higher level, 
they cannot write to a lower level. A possible solution to this problem is to form a trusted 
network base, called the trusted network interface that can communicate with all levels of 
security classifications. 
D. DISCUSSION OF OSI REFERENCE MODEL 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven layer model is the plan by which 
communications software is designed. The widely implemented OSI model facilitates control, 
analysis, upgradability, replacement, and management of the resources that constitute the 
communication network. It also makes it much easier to develop software and hardware that 
link incompatible networks because protocols can be dealt with one layer at a time 
(Fitzgerald, 1993). The OSI model serves as a framework around which a series of standard 
protocols are defined (Fitzgerald, 1993). The OSI model handles the transmission of a 
message from one terminal or application program to another distant terminal or application 
program. A description of the OSI reference model layers follows: 
• Layer 1: The physical layer is primarily concerned with the transmission of the data 
bits over the communications circuit. This layer concerns hardware, whereas 
layers two through seven co"ricern software. 
• Layer 2: The data link layer manages the basic transmission circuit established in 
layer one and transforms it into a circuit that is free of transmission errors. 
• Layer 3 : The network layer provides for the functions of internal network 
operations such as addressing and routing. This is sometimes referred to as the 
packet switching network function (Fitzgerald, 1993). 
• Layer 4: The transport layer establishes, maintains, and terminates logical 
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connections for the transfer of data between end users. 
• Layer 5: The session layer is responsible for initiating, maintaining, and terminating 
each logical session between end users as well as managing and structuring all 
sessions. 
• Layer 6: The presentation layer carries out a set of message transformations and 
formatting to present data to the end users. 
• Layer 7: The application layer is the end user's access to the network. 
E. DISCUSSION OF MESSAGING SERVICES 
A Message Handling Service (MHS) is used to transmit electronic messages through 
communication systems from the writer to the reader. 
1. - X.400 Messaging Service 
The X. 400 standard defines message handling for electronic mail in the OSI 
environment, while Unix to Unix Communication Protocol (UUCP) defines message handling 
in the Unix environment. X.400 operates at layers six and seven of the OSI Reference Model. 
X.400 defines.User Agents (UAs) and Message Transfer Agents (MTAs) along with the 
names and addresses required for an electronic mail system. Each user has a mail agent which 
is their UA. This UA allows the person using the system to type a message, include the 
recipient's address and also receive incoming messages. The interface between two VAs is 
accomplished by an MT A that takes a message from a sender's UA and delivers it to the UA 
to which it is addressed (Fitzgerald, 1993). 
X.400 also defines a private and a public domain. When an organization's private 
domain is connected to the common carrier's public domain, E-mail messages can be 
addressed on a worldwide basis. A prime example of the commercial use of the X.400 
6 
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standard is in AT &T's EasyLink Service. This service provides global public messaging that 
allows customers the flexibility of communicating with virtually anyone in the world, anytime, 
and anywhere (http://www.nafta.net/attels.html). 
2. SMTP/MIME/MOSS Messaging Service 
While X.400 is the standard for use with the OSI mode~ SMTP is the standard for use 
with Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCPIIP) networks. Currently, the 
DMS is designed with a Multi-Function Interpreter (MFI) to act as a gateway for SMTP and 
non-X. 400 compliant domains. Within the DoD there are approximately twenty different e-
mail products being used, including X.400, SMTP, and a variety of other proprietary 
protocols (MITRE Study, 1992). Each system requires a messaging gateway to translate to 
a common protocol so that messages can be exchanged between various proprietary groups, 
SMTP is used fo~ this purpose. When Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (MIME) and 
MIME Object Security Services (MOSS) are added to SMTP, it makes a very powerful 
standard thatrivals X.400. MOSS is a protocol that uses public key cryptography to apply 
end-to-end encryption from the writer to the reader. 
F. DISCUSSION OF X.500 DIRECTORY SERVICES 
X.SOO is the directory service standard for OSI networks, it is the interface between 
the users and the directory. The primary purpose ofthe X.SOO standard is to provide a 
worldwide directory for obtaining addresses to facilitate sending electronic messages 
throughout any public or private domain E-mail system (Fitzgerald, 1993). The X.SOO 
standard defines the directory of users so the proper address can be obtained in order to send 
E-mail messages (Fitzgerald, 1993). All that the writer must do is access the directory and 
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address the message to the desired reader. The directory will physically fill out the network 
addresses of the reader that the writer wishes to send the message to. 
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ll. MESSAGE SYSTEMS 
A. MESSAGE SYSTEMS BACKGROUND 




SMTP will be described in the following section and X.400 will be discussed as the 
DMS is described. 
1. Description of SMTP/MIME/MOSS 
The objective of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is to transfer mail reliably 
and efficiently. 
2. History of SMTPIMIME/MOSS 
SMTP is independent of the particular transmission subsystem and requires only a 
reliable, ordered data stream channel. The SMTP model was designed with the SMTP 
standards of 1982 and it was only capable of handling ASCII text in the message body and 
therefore did· not meet· the ·noD requirements specified in Multicorrimand Required 
Operational Capability (JMROC) 3-88 for the DMS. :MROC 3-88 is the source document for 
the system requirements and architectural guidelines of the DMS. As we will see with the 
addition ofMIME and MOSS, this standard rivals the X.400. 
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3. Present Status of SMTP!MIME/MOSS 
In 1992, RFC-1341, which defines Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME), 
was published by a group of people who had become disenchanted with X.400 because it was 
taking too long to implement it in any products. MIME defines a standard method for 
extending the capabilities of SMTP to allow items other than ASCII text, such as images, 
sound, postscript, etc. to be present in the body of the message. Although MIME itself does 
not provide any security, there is a movement to MOSS, which is a derivative of privacy 
enhanced mail (PEM) and is a proposed Internet standard for adding security services such 
as confidentiality, integrity , and authenticity to SMTP!MIME. PEM defines message 
encryption and authentication procedures for text based electronic mail messages using a 
certificate based key management mechanism. 
4. Future of SMTP!MIME!MOSS 
As the WWW continues to pervade all industries worldwide and more browsers are 
MIME/MOSS aware. Very soon the DoD will be forced to make a decision as to whether 
or not to adopt both standards or switch from one to the other. As Emmett Paige, Jr. says, 
Some people are saying we made a mistake picking X.400/X.500 rather than 
SMTP for defense messaging. There is no question in my mind that we've 
made the proper choices. However, I think there is a place for both 
messaging protocols. 0 .I ·believe that we must stay current with the rest of die 
world and be flexible to move from one protocol to another when another is 
better suited to meet our needs (Paige, 1996). 
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B. DMS OVERVIEW 
1. Description of DMS 
a. History of DMS 
By the late 1980s, it was realized that the messaging systems used within the 
DoD had reached a point where it was no longer economically or technologically feasible to 
continue updating existing systems. In 1989 :MROC 3-88 stated, 
The Department of Defense requires an improved message communication 
system, responsive to mission requirements, at reduced cost to the Services 
and Defense agencies. This system, the Defense Message System (DMS), 
must be based upon a set of validated requirements and organized under basic 
architectural guidelines (:MROC 3-88, 1989). 
- The DMS consists of all the hardware, software, procedures, personnel, and 
facilities required for electronic delivery of messages among organizations and personnel in 
the DoD. It is not a program in itself, but consists of multiple service initiatives concerning 
electronic messaging. The DMS is centered around tP.e principles of interoperability and 
standardization. :MROC 3-88 defines thirteen DMS requirements: 
1. Connectivity/Interoperability. Connectivity must be extended from writer to 
reader and the DMS must be interoperable with tactical data distribution systems 
as well as allied systems. 
2. GUaranteed delivery. The DMS must deliver a message to the intended recipient. 
3. Timely delivery. The DMS must recognize messages that require preferential 
handling and must dynamically adjust to conditions of changing traffic loads and 
conditions to provide timely delivery of critical information during both 
peacetime and crisis. 
4. Confidentiality/Security. The DMS must maintain separation of messages within 
11 
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user communities to satisfy confidentiality and security. 
5. Sender authentication. The DMS must verify that the sender did in fact originate 
the message. 
6. Integrity. The DMS must verify that the information sent was the same as the 
information received. 
7. Survivability. The DMS must provide for redundancy so that the system is 
capable of reconstitution. 
8. Availability/Reliability. The DMS must provide users with continual message 
service. 
9. Ease ofUse. The DMS must not require extensive training for proper operation. 
10. Identification of Recipients. The sender must unambiguously identify the 
recipient, the necessary directories and their authenticity are part of the DMS. 
11. Message preparation support. The DMS must support user-friendly preparation 
of messages. 
12. Storage and Retrieval Support. The DMS must support the storage of messages 
to allow for readdressal, retransmission, archiving, and analysis. 
13. Distribution Determination and Delivery. The DMS must determine the 
destination of each message and ensure delivery. 
The DMS implementation strategy is designed to provide a coordinated 
transition from the Baseline system of 1989 to the target architecture of2008. The DMS 
implementation is divided into three phases, Phase I (1989- 1994) focuses on the transition 
of Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), the current method of sending organizational 
messages, and DoD Internet e-mail to the DMS. Phase II (1995 - 2000) provides the bridge 
between the transitional capabilities and the final operational capabilities. Phase III (200 1 -
12 
2008) provides the achievement of final operational capability. Phases I and II will be 
discussed further under the present status of DMS, and Phase III will be discussed in the 
future ofDMS. 
b. Present Status of DMS 
The objectives ofPhase I were to automate telecommunication centers, extend 
the messaging interface to writers and readers, to migrate AUTODIN data pattern message 
traffic to the Defense Data Network (DDN) and the Defense Information System Network 
(DISN), eliminate the use of paper media, and phase out the telecommunication centers. The 
DDN provides a means for providing individual message services (e-mail) until the migration 
to DMS X.400 is complete. The DISN will provide the backbone for all DMS message 
services as the global telecommunications infrastructure. Phase II relies on the baseline 
AUTODIN messaging system, DoD Internet e:-mail systems, and the X.400 message handling 
system as it progresses towards DMS compliant X.400 messaging and X.500 directory 
services. The objectives ofPhase II are to expand writer to reader connectivity and support, 
provide writer to reader message security services, phase out baseline messaging systems, 
phase out baseline message formats and procedures, maintain interoperability between DMS 
and non-DMS systems, and implement DMS in a cost-effective manner. 
c. Future of DMS 
The objectives of phase III are complete implementation of the DMS target 
messaging components, maintaining interoperability between DMS and non-DMS systems, 
complete phase out of baseline messaging systems, complete phase out of all transitional 
13 
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components, and evolution to a DISN value-added service. 
2. Implementation Requirements for DMS 
Since the migration ofDoD messaging systems to the DMS has been mandated by the 
Secretary of Defense, it is imperative for all commands to understand the requirements of the 
DMS. Figure 2 shows the DMS functions and components and Figure 3 shows the DMS 
architecture. The requirements for implementing DMS have been divided into three general 
categories: 
1. DMS user components 
2. DMS infrastructure components 
3. Hardware and software installation 
a. DMS User Components 
(I) User Agent. The User Agent (UA) is a software application that 
resides on a personal computer or workstation with other office automated applications such 
as word processors and spreadsheets. The UA application is used for organizational and 
individual message preparation, transmission, and reception. The UA interacts directly with 
the user through a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which allows the workstation's operating 
system to communicate with the user in fast, visual, intuitive ways, such as the use of a 
mouse to drag and drop icons, to create and edit a message (Rice and Wold, 1995). 
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identification card used to digitally sign, encrypt, decrypt, and verify digital signatures, the 
user can draft or release organizational and individual messages and receive organizational 
and individual messages generated elsewhere. The UA provides a directory cache that will 
store the addresses and security certificates of all addresses normally used by this originator. 
If the message is destined for an addressee not in the cache, or if the address has changed, 
queries are automatically initiated to the X.500 directory system agent to obtain the correct 
address and certificate to update the cache. All directory queries are authenticated by the 
digital signature function of the Fortezza PC Card (PCMCIA) to allow access to the X.500 
directory. This prevents unauthorized UAs from accessing the military message transfer 
system, the DMS using the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) infrastructure, and 
either saturating the system with messages or imitating military organizations (Hice and Wold, 
1995). User Agents are divided into two classes, basic (mail only) and advanced (group-
ware). Within the basic class there is a P3 functionality which does not support the use of a 
Message Store (MS) and therefore connects directly to a Message Transfer Agent (MTA). 
As such, the UA must be on-line for messages to be received. A P7 functionality User Agent 
connects to a Message Store and supports delivery and storage of messages while the user 
is off-line. This is the recommended functionality for FalconLan. The advanced class of User 
Agent combine DMS messaging features with group-ware features such as scheduling and 
shared folders. User Agent applications can be implemented either entirely within the user's 
personal computer or implemented in a client-server environment. Figure 4 shows how the 
user will interface with the UA in the DMS message handling environment. 
17 
(2) Message Store. The Message Store (MS) can be viewed as a 
mailbox facility. Like the UA it is a software application that can be implemented on each PC 
or in a network. When a UA is inactive, the MS receives all messages from the message 
transfer agent and stores them until they are called by the UA. A single MS can serve 
multiple UAs. When a MS is used, there is a logical, one-to-one relationship between each 
MS and UA pair. The MS can be configured to provide automatic alert capabilities or 













































Figure 4. DMS Message Handling Environment "From DMS Expo 95" 
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individual messaging, not for organizational messaging. Figure 5 describes the DMS 
Message Store. 
(3) Directory User Agent. The Directory User Agent (DUA) is a 
software application that provides X.500 defined directory services. Additionally, DUAs 
provide a common user interface, user authentication, and local caching of directory 
information. All directory services are provided to DMS users and components (e.g., UA, 
Mail List Agent (MLA), and Multi-Function Interpreter (MFI)) through the DUAs. The 
DUA may be implemented on the user's LAN, on the campus or base, within a local region, 
or in an entire theater of operations (Hice and Wold, 1995). 
(4) Profiling User Agent. The Profiling User Agent (PUA) provides 
the same message processing capabilities as the User Agent (UA) and additionally includes 
functionality to profile messages for automatic distribution determination. The PUA is an 
application typically implemented along with other organizational messaging applications. 
After the PUA determines the appropriate recipients to receive the message, it will resubmit 
the copies of the message to the MTS for subsequent delivery (Hice and Wold, 1995). Each 
PUA retains the originator's digital signature with the message. Based on information such 
as the subject, priority, and message content, the PUA can automatically redistribute received 
messages. This is accomplished by resubmitting the message to the Message Transfer System 
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b. DMS Infrastructure Components 
(1) Message Transfer Agent. The Message Transfer Agent (MIA) 
is a store and fonvard message switch. An analogy of the MIA is the local post office 
because it is responsible for routing and transferring the mail, or in this case, the messages. 
MT As are implemented at many locations and interconnected using any variety of 
communications technology, including wireless (Hice and Wold, 1995). The MIA provides 
mail host services to local users and provides switching services for the infrastructure X. 400 
messaging network. The MTAs receive messages from a User Agent (UA), Message Store 
(MS), or another MIA The MIA is responsible for making routing decisions using the 
originator orrecipient address, it then delivers the message to the next MIA, MS, or a local 
UA. Additionally, MTAs can deliver messages to Profile User Agents (PUAs), Mail List 
Agents (J\1LAs), or Multi-Function Interpreters (MFis) (Hice and Wold, 1995). 
(2) Mail List Agent. The Mail List Agent (J\1LA) is responsible for 
managing a number ofMailing Lists (J\1L). The J\1LA supports DoD J\1Ls that may consist 
of several hundred addresses and allows the task of sending a message to a large number of 
addresses to be off-loaded to a separate application while users proceed with other activities. 
J\1LA applications may be executed as on optional DMS UA application on multifunctional 
workstations with sufficient processing capabilities or on a separate hardware platform. An 




















Figure 6. DMS Mail List Agent "From DMS Expo 95" 
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I 
(3) Multi-Function Interpreter. The Multi-Function Interpreter (MFI) 
is the DMS infrastructure component that will allow DMS users to exchange messages with 
users of legacy systems (e.g., AUTODIN or SMTP.) The MFI should be installed in the 
Message Transfer System (MTS) backbone to make it transparent to the user whether or not 
this component is used. Once DMS reaches Final Operational Capability (FOC) the MFI will 
be eliminated. Figure 7 describes the DMS Multi-Function Interpreter. 
(4) Management Workstation. The Management Workstation (MWS) 
is a critical component within the DMS management infrastructure. It provides remote 
monitoring and control of all DMS products, thereby supporting configuration, fault, 
performance~ security management, accounting for system monitoring and control, system 
administration, and customer service. It must be able to gather DMS system information 
globally and present meaningful reports to the DMS managers. A Management Agent (MA) 
is installed in each DMS component and supports the collection of component information 
and facilitates the transmission of the data to the MWS (Rice and Wold, 1995). The MWS 
interfaces to the DMS components using the Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP). The Loral integrated MWS consists of Computer Associates' ENTERPRISE 
VIEW for E-mail application management, Oracle Relational Database for reporting and 
configuration management, and the Remedy Action Request System for trouble ticket 
generation and tracking. The MWS is a software application usually implemented on a high 
performance UNIX or NT workstation. 
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(5) Certification Authority Workstation. The Certification Authority 
Workstation (CAW) is a PC based application used to program and maintain Fortezza PC 
Cards (PCMCIA) for users. Each user's Fortezza card includes not only private security keys, 
but also the user's messaging privileges, individual messaging only or organizational message 
release, including organizational level, precedence, and classification authorized. This trusted 
workstation supports functions that include decentralized assignment of directory names and 
creation of X. 509 certificates. As part of this process, the CAW applications initialize the 









SMTP - Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
MIME- Multipurpose Internet Message Extension 
( 6) Administrative Directory User Agent. The Administrative 
Directory User Agent (ADUA) is a Directory User Agent (DUA) software application that 
provides the directory administrator the ability to modify, add, and delete X.500 DMS entries. 
Certification authorities use the ADUA application resident in the Certification Authority 
Workstation (CAW) to perform a number of directory related security operations. The Mail 
List Manager (MLM) will also use an ADUA to update Mail List (ML) information in the 
directory. 
(7) Directory System Agent. The Directory System Agent (DSA) is 
responsible to respond to queries for DMS X.500 directory information from DUAs and other 
DSAs. In order to support this function, each DSA stores a fragment of the DMS X.500 
Directory Information Table (DIT) and a fragment of the Directory Information Base (DIB). 
The DIB is the collection of all DITs. The DMS X.500 directory is composed of the sum of 
all DIB and DIT fragments. The DITs consist of hierarchically related objects which model 
the geographic and organizational structure ofDMS readers and writers. In this distributed 
directory environment, queries and updates are resolved by groups of cooperating DSAs. 
c. Hardware and Software Installation 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA )will fund and be responsible for 
the acquisition, installation, and maintenance of all DMS infrastructure components: 
1. Backbone Message Transfer Agent (BMTA) 
2. Directory System Agent (DSA) 
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3. Mail List Agent (MLA) 
4. Multifunction Interpreter (l'viFI) 
5. Certification Authority Workstation (CAW) 
6. Administrative Directory User Agent (ADUA) 
7. Management Workstation (MWS) 
Each service will fund the purchase of the DMS user components: 
1. User Agent (UA) 
2. Message Store (MS) 
3. Directory User Agent (DUA) 
4. F ortezza Cards 
5. "PC Cards" (PCMCIA Cards) 
In order to be ready for site implementation there are many activities that must 
be completed, an example of some are listed here: 
1. IdentifY the locations where infrastructure components will be implemented and 
how many are required. 
2. Develop and implement policies and procedures for DMS implementation. 
3. Distribute Fortezza cards to all users. 
More specific requirements will be discussed in Chapter IV, when we look at 
the proposed implementation of the DMS and MISSI in FalconLan. 
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ill. SECURITY SYSTEMS 
A. SECURITY SYSTEMS BACKGROUND 
As computer networks play an increasing role in the DoD, especially with regards to 
personal and organizational communications, the need for security is unparalleled. 
Connectivity to a Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN), or the Internet 
provides a possible worldwide communications path. In response to this security issue, the 
National Security Agency (NSA) began a computer security development effort called the 
Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative (MISSI). 
1. Description of MISSI 
MISSI encompasses communications security and computer security in its goal to 
provide dependable and affordable security services necessary to protect information from 
unauthorized disclosure or modification and to provide mechanisms to authenticate users 
participating in the exchange of information (Cooney and Bilinski, 1995). In order to provide 
multilevel security (MLS), MISSI is evolving a series of products based on common standards 
and interoperable with commercially available products. The MISSI initiative is focused on 
providing security services through a series of increasingly enhanced releases. Each release 
is designed to increase user capabilities, reduce residual security risks, and keep pace with 
technology and performance advantages while maintaining compatibility with previous 
releases. 
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a. History of MISS/ 
:MISSI is a framework for security of all networks using commercial products 
and standard service offerings. It is not a security solution for the DMS only. :MISSI is to 
be available to NATO and other U.S. allies as well. :MISSI will provide a single, integrated, 
consistent security infrastructure for all DoD needs: e-mail, electronic data interchange (ED I), 
electronic commerce (EC), intelligence, command and control, and business systems. The 
primary :MISSI customer is the DMS, but :MISSI is planned to be used for applications such 
as e-mail, remote login, file transfer, and database management. 
b. Present Status of MISS/ 
- On Friday, 15 September 1995, the NSA awarded contracts to National 
Semiconductor, Inc., Santa Clara, California and SPYRUS, Inc., San Jose, California, for the 
production of more than 310,000 F ortezza PC Cards (PCMCIA). The price of the F ortezza 
card to be delivered under this contract is $69.5 0 with deliveries scheduled to commence in 
May 1996 at a rate of 15,000 cards per month. The Fortezza cards function as combined 
individual and organizational identification cards for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) data. 
Figure 8 describes the Fortezza card. The :MISSI SBU solution set product is 
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Figure 8. MISSI Fortezza Implementation "From DMS Expo 95" 
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F ortezza products can be used to protect any type of data including X 400 and 
SMTP E-mail, in other words there is modularization between the crypto engine and the 
message security protocol. It uses Type II security algorithms to provide network related 
security services such as message confidentiality, message integrity, message authentication, 
access control, and non-repudiation. Type II security provides protection for SBU data, but 
not classified data. Type I security is used to protect classified and SBU data. The Fortezza 
card is used to digitally sign, encrypt, decrypt, and verify digital signatures of data. The PC 
Card (PCMCIA) reader can be connected to a personal computer through a standard bus slot 
or through an adaptor connected to a parallel port or a Small Computer Systems Interface 
(SCSI) bus. The Fortezza/MSP software will support applications such as User Agent (UA), 
Mail List Agent (MLA), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and file protection software. 
c. Future of MISS/ 
To forge into the future, NSA is developing the Fortezza Plus card which will 
provide Type I and II cryptographic algorithms. Type I algorithms will be used to protect 
data classified up to the Secret level for transmission across unprotected networks (Rice and 
Wold, 1995). The Fortezza Plus card provides Type II algorithms to protect SBU data. The 
Type II algorithm will be backward compatible with the F ortezza card, so protected data may 
be communicated between workstations equipped with either the Fortezza or Fortezza Plus 
card. Additional applications are underway utilizing F ortezza cards for file transfers, web 
browsers, remote login, database management, and Firewalls. 
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2. MISSI Building Block Products 
a. Cryptographic Cards 
A central component ofJ'vliSSI is a small, low cost, thick credit card sized 
plug-in card called the Fortezza. The Fortezza card is built to international PCMCIA 
standards that is inserted in a standard Type 2 PC Card (PCMCIA) reader. Used in 
conjunction with a personal identification number, the card provides effective authentication 
of the user's identity and access privileges. There are two basic versions of Fortezza as 
described above; Fortezza and Fortezza Plus. The Fortezza card contains its own processor 
and memory, and inputs and outputs through the 50 pin connection points on the end of the 
card. 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) plans to provide every DoD 
employee who will be issuing DMS messages a Fortezza card. Along with cryptographic data 
and various J'vliSSI algorithms, the card will contain important security information about the 
user, such as clearance information and authorizations (Cooney and Bilinski, 1995). 
The Fortezza card uses public key cryptology technology where the private 
key is kept secret and is only used by the owner of the card, but the public key is made 
available to anyone. For the DMS, the public keys will be available in the X.500 directory. 
b. Cryptographic Card Applications 
There are currently many applications under development that use J'vliSSI 
cryptographic cards. Each application is built on a security protocol such as MSP for e-mail. 
Applications call J'vliSSI libraries, drivers and the standard command sets for the cards by 
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using the :MISSI cryptographic application programming interface (API). 
c. Secure Computing 
Secure computing adds features and assurances to the computing environment 
that enhance its overall security. Example features include data labeling, data separation, 
access control lists, and data integrity. Assurances are specific design and design analysis 
activities taken to gain confidence that security critical functions are performing properly; and 
that hidden functions that could be detrimental to security, such as covert channels, are 
eliminated or minimized. Initially, most user personal computers using :MISSI technology 
will be used in untrusted operating systems. Over time, more users are expected to migrate 
to the use oftrusted operating systems. Trusted operating systems provide data labeling and 
separation, verified systems access, reliable auditing, and reliable cryptographic card 
invocation. Integrating secure computing components with F ortezza can provide increased 
writer to reader security at the desktop. 
d Secure Servers 
A Secure Network Server (SNS) typically resides on the LAN boundary acting 
as an MLS guard for the information handled and transmitted on the local network. An SNS 
located on the border of a computer network handling Secret information is an example. The 
SNS would ensure that Secret information handled on the network being protected would not 
inadvertently be passed to a network that is not equipped to handle Secret data (Cooney and 














e. In-Line Network Encryptors 
In-Line Network Encryption (INE) products are usually located at user 
enclave boundaries between local and wide are networks, or on a single network between 
individual hosts/workstations that are operating at different security levels. The users served 
by an individual Subordinate Message Transfer Agent (SMTA) are collectively referred to as 
a user enclave. These products will provide both encryption and access control services. By 
providing end-to-end encryption of data communications and access control between LANs, 
INE products will ensure that information being transmitted is not disclosed to unauthorized 
parties (Cooney and Bilinski, 1995). TheINE interface with the Multi-Function Interpreter 
(MFI) is transparent to the user because the MFI will apply or remove the MSP encryption 
to the messages as they move in and out of systems that do not support MIS SI components 











Figure 10. In-Line Network Encryptor (INE) 
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f Network Security Management 
Network security management products provide the common infrastructure 
necessary for MISSI. They perform functions such as key, privilege, and certificate 
management and the collection and analysis of security relevant audit data. 
3. Commercial Equivalents of MISSI 
a. Firewalls 
A firewall is a collection of components placed between two networks that 
collectively have the following properties (Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994): 
1. All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall. 
This means that all modems must be located behind the firewall. 
2. Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to 
pass. 
3. The firewall itself is immune to penetration. 
Firewalls separate environments operating under differing security policies and 
control data flow between the different environments. Most commercial Firewalls are low 
assurance components. MISSI supports usage of low assurance Firewalls, but also provides 
high assurance Firewalls based on the Secure Network server (SNS). Use of filtering routers 
and packet screening by both the sender and recipient address blocks provides most of the 
real work of the firewall. 
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b. Public Key Cryptography 
In a public key encryption system each user has two keys, one key that does 
not have to be kept secret, the public key, and a key that is kept private. The advantage of 
this is that anyone can send a secret message to a user by applying the receiver's public key 
to the message, the receiver then uses their secret key to decrypt the message (Pfleeger, 
1989). Some examples of public key cryptography are: Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA), 
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). 
c. Kerberos 
Kerberos is a system where a client and server share a key used to encrypt data 
over the network. Because the cryptography is based on shared keys, Kerberos is known as 
a symmetric key system (Malamud, 1992). 
B. Advantage of MISSI Over Commercial Products 
By incorporating some of the best to offer commercial features, :MISSI will provide 
the user with a wide range of information systems security capabilities. These capabilities 
include services which ensure that transmitted data is neither accidentally corrupted nor 
deliberately tampered with by a third party prior to receipt. Strong identification and 
authentication measures are included at both the workstation and at various network 
gateways to deny access and privileges to unauthorized users. Data is encrypted to provide 
confidentiality. Digital signatures ensure the positive and irrefutable identification of the 
sender. :MISSI services offer protection against the unauthorized disclosure or modification 
of information while enabling the transmission of data between different security levels. 
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Additionally, all :MISSI products will be X.400 compliant and will be able to be used in the 
implementation of the DMS. Best of all, as the technology improves, the :MISSI product 
improvements will remain backwards compatible. 
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IV. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DESCRIPTION OF FALCONLAN 
This chapter assumes a basic knowledge ofLocal Area Network (LAN) technology. 
For a brief review the author recommends Fitzgerald's Business Data Communications: 
Basic Concepts, Security, and Design or any other LAN text. 
The FalconLan is divided between two buildings located at the Presidio of Monterey. 
Building 616 contains the offices of the Officer in Charge ( OIC) and Assistant Officer in 
Charge (AOIC) and has a total of seven terminals connected to the network. Building 629A 
contains the general offices of the detachment and has a total of 19 terminals connected to the 
network. Figure 11 provides the layout ofBuilding 629A and Figure 12 provides the layout 
ofBuilding 616. Figure 13 provides the Local Area Network diagrams for Building 616 and 
629A. Thin Ethernet (10Base2)1 is used throughout both buildings and the connection 
between the two buildings will be fiber optic cable. Each building has one Windows NT 3. 51 
server for all the terminals in its building. Each terminal will have its own copy of 
WordPerfect, Microsoft Mail, Paradox Data Base, and Intranet!Internet services. All 
remaining application software will reside with the two servers. The terminals in building 616 
are connected to the server in a bus topology, while the terminals in building 629A are divided 
1Thin Ethernet (10Base2) means the transmission speed is ten million bits per 
second, using the baseband transmission methodology, and it has a maximum distance of 
200 meters between terminals or repeaters. 
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into five bus segments that are interconnected through a hub. The bus topology connects all 
nodes to a cable running the length of the network. The circuit is not joined together to form 
a loop, but each terminal uses the bus to communicate with every other terminal. Data is 
typically transmitted in both directions from the originating node, with other nodes checking 
the data as it passes to determine if they are the ultimate address of the data. Data may pass 
directly from one node to another, or it may be routed through a head end control point. The 
head end controller turns the data transmission around and sends it back down the cable in 
the opposite direction to the terminator. This topology is easily expandable to accommodate 
additional nodes and the loss of a single node has no impact on the rest of the network. This 
is the topology chosen for FalconLan primarily because the network size is anticipated to 
double to approximately 60 terminals in the near future. Figure 14 depicts a bus topology. 
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Figure 13. FalconLan Layout "From NISE East" 
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B. INSTALLATION OF THE DMS COMPONENTS WITH FALCONLAN 
The DMS contract, providing software, hardware, and services to create this new 
messaging system, was awarded in June 1995 to the LORAL Federal Systems team (DMS 
Product Guide, 1995). The DMS products are currently undergoing mandatory compliance 
and conformance testing, which is required prior to the products being made available for 
purchase from the contract (Philbin, 1996). Purchase from the contract will be available after 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is realized. It is anticipated that IOC will occur in July, 
1996. The DMS contract provides ten Contract Line Item Numbers(CLINs): 
1. CLIN 0001. This CLIN is the program management and infrastructure CLIN. 
This CLIN will be used by DISA and the Air Force Acquisition Office only. 
2. CLIN 0002. This CLIN is for ordering the software products for the DMS 
infrastructure ( eg., Directory System Agents, Multi-Function Interpreters, Mail 
List Agents, Message Transfer Agents, and Management Workstations) and the 
DMS user components (eg., User Agents, Directory User Agents, Profiling User 
Agents, Message Stores, and Management Workstations.) 
3. CLIN 0003. This CLIN is for ordering hardware platforms and products (eg., 
PC Card readers and any terminal upgrades.) 
4. CLIN 0004. This CLIN is for support services such as recommendations on site 
architecture, LAN topology and configuration, etc. 
5. CLIN 0005. This CLIN is for an implementation service package to support less 
than 750 users. Any site survey for more than 750 user should be addressed 
through CLIN 0004. 
6. CLIN 0006. This CLIN is for training. Several training courses are currently 
planned for implementation in 1996. 
7. CLIN 0007. This CLIN is for hardware maintenance. All hardware items come 
with a one year warranty. The PC Card readers are warrantied on a mail back 
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basis, with replacement within five days of receipt. 
8. CLIN 0008. This CLIN is for manuals, documentation, and reference guides. 
9. CLIN 0009. This CLIN is for material and travel expenses for services ordered 
under CLINs 0004, 0005, or 0006. 
10. CLIN 0010. This CLIN provides the contract award fee. 
This section will provide recommendations for two implementation options for an 
SBU enclave: basic functionality and full functionality. An SBU enclave has all PCs protected 
by having personnel use Fortezza cards and there is a firewall between the LAN and any 
external network, such as the Internet. These two options are based on the currently available 
products. 
1. Basic Functionality Implementation 
Basic functionality implementation will provide the user individual messaging 
capabilities within the command and will rely on the base infrastructure for organizational 
messaging. For a basic implementation, the following components are recommended: 
1. User Agent 
2. Directory User Agent 
3. Message Store 
4. Message Transfer Agent 
5. Administrative Directory User Agent 
The available User Agent software package includes an integrated Directory User 
48 
Agent (DUA) that provides access to the X.SOO Directory Services. The User Agents 
currently available for Windows NT 3. 51 that provide the previously mentioned P7 
functionality are listed in Table 1. 
Product No. Product Description Unit Price 
UAOOOS Microsoft DMS-GOSIP Mail Only UA for Windows NT $62.00 
UA0016 Microsoft DMS-GOSIP UA for Windows NT (Group) $118.00 
Table 1. User Agent Options 
The recommended User Agent implementation is the groupware functionality Product 
No. UA0016. It is recommended that 4 copies be procured, two individual copies for the 
OIC and AOIC and two copies for the network servers. 
The Microsoft Exchange product currently available contains an integrated Message 
Transfer Agent and Message Store and is shown in Table 2. 
Product No. Product Description Unit Price 
MMOOO 1 Microsoft DMS-GOSIP Information Exchange for $1,950.00 
Windows NT 
Table 2. Message Store Options 
It is recommended that one copy be procured to service all the User Agents. The 
enterprise edition with 25 access licencesis $2857.95 (academic price) vice the $1,950 shown 
in Table 2. 
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The Administrative Directory User Agent is shown in Table 3. 
Product No. Product Description Unit Price 
ADUAOI ES/ ADUA for Windows $38.00 
Table 3. Administrative Directory User Agent Options 
It is recommended that one copy be procured for the local DMS manager. 
2. Full Functionality Implementation 
Full functionality implementation will provide the user individual messaging 
capabilities within the command and organizational messaging external to the command 
without relying on the base infrastructure. For a full implementation, the following 
components,_ in addition to the basic implementation, are recommended: 
1. Management Workstation 
2. Profiling User Agent 
3. Mail List Agent 
4. Certification Authority Workstation 
The above listed components all require one Hewlett Packard Workstation that will 
be isolated from the LAN and will run only DMS software. The recommended model for 
NSGD Monterey is HP- Series 700, Model 715/64 (Product No. H00004) with a price of 
$5,644. This workstation and all required components should be provided by DISA as part 
of the DMS infrastructure costs. The cost of the full implementation must be considered to 
serve all the local commands (Presidio of Monterey, Fleet Numeric Oceanographic Command, 
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and Naval Postgraduate School) because all three commands can share a common DMS 
support infrastructure. 
C. INSTALLATION OF MISSI COMPONENTS WITH FALCONLAN 
The MISSI components required for FalconLan are: 
1. PC Card Readers (one per PC) 
2. Fortezza Cards (one per person) 
The PC Card readers are available as either an external or internal product. The 
internal PC Card reader is compatible with PCs that support either ISA, EISA, VESA, and/or 
PCI buses. The external product is either SCSI or Parallel. The available products are listed 
in Table 4. 
Product No. Product Description Unit Price 
H00013 External SCSI ARGUS/2100-2 $194.00 
H00014 External Parallel ARGUS 2000-2 $159.00 
H00015 ARGUS 2150 $80.00 
Table 4. PC Card Reader Options 
The recommended option is the internal PC Card reader, which would take the place 
of the 5 114'' floppy dri\re of each PC and allow for Fortezza card access in the front of the 
PC. 




V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROGRAM MANAGERS FOR SYSTEM 
MATURATION 
The program managers must ensure that new technologies and standards are fully 
explored to determine what is best for the future ofthe Defense Messaging System. New 
technologies are emerging at an increasingly rapid pace and the DoD must review these 
technologies to see which will best meet the future needs of the DoD. 
B. AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY 
There are two main areas that remain for further study of this topic: 
1. Providing the best allocation of infrastructure equipment for the Presidio of 
Monterey, the Naval Postgraduate School, and Fleet Numeric Oceanography 
Command. 
2. Performing software reliability testing of the DMS certified compliant products 
to determine their reliability. 
C. CLOSING REMARKS 
This thesis can be extended to any command's Local Area Network to implement the 
DMS using J\1ISSI. However, DISA must provide further guidelines for Local Area Network 
Installation teams to ensure that·the equipment purchased (e.g., hardware, software, and 
network operating systems) will interface with the Defense Messaging System and will allow 
for growth and expansion. Too often, in top-down driven programs, commands are left 
waiting for equipment and training so long that they go out and do it themselves. This creates 
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integration and compatibility problems. By allowing commands to purchase the required 
equipment off of a product list for their network is one solution to the top-down problem. 
This thesis has provided specific recommendations to the Naval Security Group Detachment 
in Monterey to ensure that when the DMS reaches final operational capability, they will be 
prepared to immediately get on board. Additionally, once the DMS has been implemented 
at NSGD Monterey, it can act as a field site for other commands to see how it was done and 
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In-Line Network Encryption 
Internet Protocol 
Local Area Network 
Management Agent 
Multifunction Interpreter 
Message Handling Service 
Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative 
Mail List 
Mail List Agent 
Mail List Manager 
Multilevel Security 
:MIME Object Security Service 

























Message Security Protocol 
Message Transfer Agent 
Message Transfer System 
Management Workstation 
Management Workstation 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
National Computer Security Center 
National Security Agency 
Naval Security Group Detachment 
Officer In Charge 
Open Systems Interconnection 
Personal Computer 
Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
Privacy Enhanced Mail 
Pretty Good Privacy 
Profiling User Agent 
Rivest-Shamir-Adelman 
Sensitive But Unclassified 
Small Computer Systems Interface 
Secure Hash Algorithm 
Subordinate Message Transfer Agent 
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SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SNS Secure Network Server 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TS Top Secret 
UA User Agent 
UUCP Unix to Unix Communications Protocol 
WAN Wide Area Network 
www World Wide Web 
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